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Abstract 
IP Spoofing Attack and Its Countermeasures 
Yang Xiang and Wanlei Zhou 
School of Information Technology, 
Deakin University 
Email: {yxi •• vanlei}@deakin.edu.au 
IP spoofing is a technique used to gain unauthorized access to computers, whereby the intruder sends 
messages to a computer with an IP address indicating that the message is coming/i'om a trusted host. It 
causes serious security problem in the cyber world, and is currently exploited widely in the information 
wm/are. This paper at .first introduces the IP spoo.fing attack through examples, technical issues and 
attacking types. Later its countermeasures are analysed in detail, which include authentication and 
enClJiption, .filtering and IP traceback. In particular, an IF traceback mechanism, Flexible Deterministic 
Packet Marking (FDPM) is presented. Since the IP spoofing problem can not be solved only by technology, 
but it also l1eed.~ social regulation, the legal issues and economic impact are discussed in the later part. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to the Computer Crime and Security Survey 2004 (AusCert, 2004), the annual lost caused by 
computer crime is AU$15,921,064 in Australia in 2004, which is an increase of 35% of the last year's 
annual lost (AU$11,800,783). The researchers and defence planners have been seriously concerning the 
information warfare strategies and tactics for years since the mid-I 980s. Today, the growth in popularity of 
thc Internet and related technologies has significantly increased this concern. Military, government, 
corporations, and international organizations are all involved in the activities to protect their information 
infrastructures. 
The vulnerability to information security is also increasing because the dependency on computers and 
network communications is increasing. The media reports on new computer crimes, system break-ins, 
malicious code attacks, and the ever-growing threat of cyber terrorism at almost every week. In most of the 
criminal incidents, the attackers usually try to hide their true identity, from disguises to aliases to caller-id 
blocking. IP spoofing is one of the most common f01111S of on-line camouflage in information warfare. In 
this paper, the IP spoofing attacks and it countermeasures are discussed. Current countermeasures include 
authentication and encryption, filtering and IP traceback. In particular, a new IP spoofing defence 
mechanism, Flexible Deterministic Packet Marking (FDPM) traceback technique is presented. The legal 
issues and economic impact associated with the IP spoofing are discussed in the later part. 
IP SPOOFING 
Definition 
The word "Spoof' in IP spoofing means to "fool". In networking, the telm is used to describe a variety of 
ways in which hardware and software can be fooled (Webopedia). IP spoofing involves trickery that makes 
a message appear as if it came from an authorized IP address. The definition of IP spoofing is given by 
(Webopedia) as 
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A technique used to gain unauthorized access to computers, whereby the intruder sends messages to a 
computer with an IF address indicating that the message is comingfi'Oln a trusted host. 
In order to achieve the goal of IP spoofing, a hacker must first use a variety of techniques to find an IP 
address of a trusted host and then modify the packet headers so that it appears that the packets are coming 
from that host. This technique has been used by the malicious network users to launch many attacks, such 
as man in the middle attack (Bhansali, 2001), Distributed Denial of Service attack (Garber, 2000) and so 
on. It is also exploited to falsify an e-mail header to make it appear as though it originated from a different 
address, for spam related activities. Currently some routers and firewall arrangements can offer some 
protection against IP spoofing. However, the routers and firewalls can only detect the spoofed IP addresscs 
from their own networks. It is still a long way to develop a successful solution to solve this problem. 
History and Examples 
The history of IP spoofing technique can be traced back to 1980's. Morris (Morris, 1985) first discovered a 
security weakness in the TCP protocol known as sequence prediction. He used TCP sequence number 
prediction to construct a TCP packet sequence without ever receiving any responses from the server. This 
method can spoof a trusted host on a local network. 
In 1994 a hacker named Kevin Mitnick launched a sophisticated IP spoofing attack against Tsutomu 
Shim0111ura's computers in San Diego (Gulker, 2001). Two different attack mechanisms were uscd, one is 
IP source address spoofing and the other is TCP sequence number prediction. These mechanisms werc used 
to gain initial access to a diskless workstation being used mostly as an X terminal. After root access had 
been obtained, an existing connection to another system was hijacked by means of a loadable kernel 
STREAMS module. 
In February 2000, Yahoo becomes the first website hit by a series of high-profile Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks in a three-day period. During the next hours, Amazon.com, eBuy, CNN.com, 
Buy.com, ZDNet, E*Trade, Excite.com were all subject to total or regional outages by DDoS attacks. In 
some cases, the servers were flooded by even 1 gigabit per second of incoming data, which caused them to 
go offline for several hours (Garber, 2000). The attacking packets that generated by the attacking machines 
are usually spoofed with the invalid random IP source addresses. 
Licour (2002) described a smart IP address spoofing in his paper. The IP smart spoofing uses a 
combination of ARP cache poisoning, network address translation and routing. It does not require any 
sophisticated hack and it can be applied in standard application. According to the tests, many operating 
systems are subject to this attack, such as Windows 9x, NT, 2000, XP, Solaris 8, Linux kernel 2.2 and 2.4, 
Cisco lOS 12, and Nokia IPSO 3.5 operating systems. 
Technical Issues 
The inherent origin of the possibility of IP spoofing is the limitation of design of the Internet Protocol 
(RFC791) and the Transmission Control Protocol (RFC793). Since Internet protocol (lP) is a 
connectionless model, which is used to route packets on a network, there is no information regarding 
transaction state. Moreover, there is no method in this protocol to ensure if a packet is successfully 
delivered to the destination or not. The source address is stored in the 32-bit "source address" field in the IP 
header. However, there is no restriction to authenticate the validity of the field, so it can be easily modified 
by an attacker. Each datagram is transferred independently, because of the stateless naturc of IP. There is 
no clue to figure out the relationship between the packets transferred in the same packets flow. 
On the other hand, the TCP header can also be easily modified by the malicious users. Not like the IP 
protocol, TCP is connection-oriented. The participants in a TCP session must first build a connection by the 
3-way handshake and then update one another on progress by sequences and acknowledgements. This 
design is to maintain data reliability by the acknowledgement information exchanged between the sender 
and the receiver. In the TCP header, there are some fields, such as the source port and sequencing 
information, can be manipulated easily by the attackers. 
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With the hacking tools, a malicious network user can forge an IP header or TCP header without difficulty. 
The target host can be fooled by the source IP address field or, hijacked with the wrong session by the TCP 
sequence number prediction. 
Attacking Types 
Session hijacking - The attackers sniff the network traffic and record the sequence and acknowledgement 
numbers, then predict them by accurate calculation. Then by corrupting the data stream of an established 
connection, the attacker re-establishing it based on correct sequence and acknowledgement numbers with 
the attack machine. This technique offers the attacker effectively bypass any authentication measures taken 
pJace to build the connection. Nowadays most of the operating systems use random algorithms to generate 
the sequence number; so it is difficult for an attacker to predict them accurately. Therefore such attacks are 
Jess prevalent than the others. 
Man in the middle attack - This kind of attacks is launched by a malicious party to intercept a legitimate 
communication between two trusted parties. By controlling the flow of communication, the attacker can 
steal, eliminate or modify the information sent by one of the original participants without the knowledge of 
either the original sender or the recipient. The victim then discloses its confidential information to the 
attacker, because it relies on the presumably trusted but spoofed identity of the original sender. This 
technique is usually used by the attacker to inject malicious data or commands into an existing stream of 
data that is passed between a client and server application or a peer-to-peer network connection. 
I f the attacker can change all routing tables to point to the spoofed IP address, all the network packets that 
are addressed to the spoofed address can be intercepted. Such attacks are often carried out by using network 
packet sniffers and utilize the limitation of routing and transport protocols. The potential damage by the 
attacks are theft of information, hijacking of an ongoing communications session to gain access to private 
network resources, traffic analysis to derive information about a network and its users, Denial of Service, 
corruption oftransmitted data, and introduction of new infoll11ation into network sessions. 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack - DDoS attack is an availability attack, for a DDoS attack is 
characterized by an explicit attempt from an attacker to prevent legitimate users of a service from using the 
desired resource (CERT, 2004) (Xiang et a!., 2004b). The attackers are not going to thieve, modify or 
remove the information exchanged on networks, but they attempt to impair a network service, thus to block 
legitimate users fl·om accessing the service. In order to launch a DDoS attack, the attacker first scan 
millions of machines for vulnerable service and other weakness, then gain access and compromise these 
zombies or slave machines. These infected machines can recruit more zombies. When the assault starts, the 
real attacker hides the identity by the IP spoofing techniques and sends orders to zombies to perform the 
attacks. When hundreds or thousands of hosts are participating in the attack by sending spoofed packets, it 
is very challenging to quickly control the attack. 
COUNTERMEASURES 
It is d1e design of the TCPIIP protocol allows the IP Spoofing problems. Today effective countermeasures 
are still under research. Many countermeasures are proposed to defeat the IP spoofing problems, such as 
authentication, encryption, filtering, and IP traceback. 
Authentication and Encryption 
Authentication is the process of reliably verifying the identity of someone (or something) (Kaufman, 2002). 
The address-based authentication assumes that the identity of the source can be inferred based on the 
network address from which packets arrive. The basic idea of it is the computer stores information which 
specifics accounts on other hosts that should have access to its resources. The routers are designed to 
discriminate the addresses on a per-link basis, and to prevent someone from injecting bad routing messages. 
However, if the message is not encrypted, it is easy for an attacker to monitor the authentication process 
then forge it. So to avoid using the source address authentication and implement cryptographic 
authentication system widely is a feasible way to defend IP spoofing attacks. Other measures include 
configuring the network to reject packets from the network that claim to originate from a local address; 
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enabling the encryption sessions at the router when allowing outside connections from trusted hosts. 
However, it needs many resources to process the authentication and encryption. 
Filtering 
One of the simple and straightforward methods to counter IP spoofing attacks is to filter out the malicious 
stream completely. Filtering is to drop the unwanted packets in certain routers. From thc point of view of 
deployment, filtering can be classified as ingress filtering and egress filtering. Ingress filtering is deployed 
on the external interface of a network and drops all spoofed incoming packets, for instance, the IP 
addresses that belong to its internal network, which is the obvious case. On the other hand, egress filtering 
is applied on the internal interface of a network to deal with the packets going out. In the same way, egress 
filtering drops all the packets that do not have their local network addresses. It would be an efficient 
defence scheme against IP spoofing attacks if these filtering mechanisms are widely accepted and 
deployed, because it could perfectly stop all spoofed packets travelling through the Internet (Xiang, 2004c). 
Furthennore, it helps to traceback any packet's original source, since it forces users to send true IP 
addresses. However, these mechanisms are not widely deployed by the ISPs or even resisted because of the 
liability problems. 
Ingress filtering is initially proposed in RFC2267 (Ferguson, 2000). In current Internet environment, it is 
infeasible to cover the whole network by such a defence system, although in a theoretically perfect 
situation, it can prevent all the forged IP addresses. The requirement of global deployment is also essential 
to the Source Address Validity Enforcement Protocol (SAVE) (Li, 2002). In a distributed fashion, the 
SAVE protocol maintains an incoming table at each participating routcr, which indicates the router's proper 
incoming interface for packets from all sources. Each router sends SAVE updates to all destinations in its 
forwarding table, sending a new update when routing to a destination is changed. Then all routers have sent 
such updates to their destinations, each router will have a complete set of legitimate sources of each 
incoming interface. How it works well with the existed network protocols is still an open question. 
Furthennore, the authentication and computational overhead also need further study. 
Another filtering mechanism is proposed as Hop-Count Filtering (Jin, 2003). The idea is that although the 
attacker can forge any field in IP header, the number of hops an IP packet takes to reach its destination 
cannot be falsified. So Hop-Count Filtering (HCF) could be mainly applied to filter the spoofed IP packets. 
It extracts the TTL information from the IP head to compute the hop-count, and then by comparing the 
computed hop-count with the stored hop-count, the likely spoofed packets are identified. It takes no action 
to defend attacks until in the action state because this method still has some certain false positive rate. In 
the Internet there may be a single IP address that has multiple valid hop-counts at the same time, so the 
result ofthis method becomes less creditable. 
IP Traceback 
IP traceback is the ability to trace IP packets to their origins (Aljifri, 2003); it provides the dcfense system 
with the ability to identify true source of the packets causing the IP spoofing. The aim of traceback is to 
construct the path of each router traversed by the attack packet on its journey from source to the victim 
(Snoeren, 2002). In IP traceback, the source IP addresses in the IP header are not used to identify the 
attackers. Current IP traceback mechanisms can be classified into four main categories as following, link 
testing, messaging, logging, and packet marking. 
Link testing methods include input debugging (Stone, 2000) and controlled flooding methods (Burch, 
2000). The main idea of it is to start from the victim to find the attack from upstream links by testing 
possible routes, and then determine which one carries the attack traffic. Although link testing has some 
advantages such as compatibility with existing protocols, routers and network infrastructure, it also has 
many significant limitations. First, it consumes a great deal of time to establish the attack path that may 
include multiple branch points. However, the attack does not often last for an enough long time for 
traceback. Second, if the attack comes from within the backbone itself, or, a backbone router is a victim, it 
is not suitable for this method to reconstruct the attack path. Moreover, if some attacks are only composed 
of a few packets, this method becomes less effective. 
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Another traceback technique is messaging. Bellovin proposed an ICMP message to find the source of 
forged IP packets (Bellovin, 2000). Allison Mankin modified this method by proposing an intension-driven 
ICMP traceback (Mankin, 2001). However, if the attacking packets contribute only a small amount of the 
total attack traffic, it is difficult for this method to rebuild the real path. Moreover, ICMP packets arc often 
treated or filtered by routers with a low priority, thus it is also less effective. ICMP traceback is vulnerable 
to attackers with the falsified ICMP messages. In general, the messaging traceback introduces additional 
network traffic, and cannot handle the highly distributed attacks. 
Logging is to store the traffic data for analysis. Although to store all the data in the network is impossible, 
probabilistic sampling or storing transformed information is still feasible. For example, trajectory sampling 
is used to measure the network traffic (Duffield, 2000), Alex C. Snoeren (2002) proposed a hash-based 
logging traceback method, T. Baba (2002) proposed a scheme that the tracing agents (tracers) arc deployed 
in the network to log the attack packets, and are coordinated by the managing agents. The main advantage 
of this method is that it can even find the source of a single packet in some situations (Snoeren, 2002), 
however, it needs excessive processing and storage requirements, which makcs it difficult to be widely 
deployed. 
The idea of packet marking is to insert traceback data into the IP packet on its way through the various 
routers from the attack source to the destination. Then the marks in the IP packets can be used to deduce the 
path of thc malicious traffic. Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) (Savage, 200 I) is one of the packet 
marking methods. The assumption of PPM is that the attacking packets arc much more frequent than the 
normal packets. It lets routers mark the packets with path information probabilisticaUy and lets the victim 
reconstruct the attack path by using the marked packets. The PPM encodes the information in rarely used 
field within the IP header. In order to save storage in IP header field, compressed edge fhlgment sampling 
method is used. It requires less traffic volume than ICMP traceback, but it encounters computational 
difficulties as the numbers of attack sources increases. In order to reduce the number of packets needed to 
reconstruct the attack path, (Peng, 2002) proposed an adjusted PPM. To some degree it solved the problem 
of vulnerabilities of PPM (Park, 200 I), which is easy to be affected by spoofed marking field. 
Another stream of packet marking methods, which does not usc the probabilistic assumption above, is the 
Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) (Belenky, 2003). This scheme has many advantages over others, 
such as simple implementation, no bandwidth requirement, less computation overhead, free fr0111 the 
falsified marking, etc. However, to perform a successful traceback, enough packets also must be collected 
to reconstruct the attack path. Flexible Deterministic Packet Marking (FDPM), an optimized version of 
DPM proposed by Xiang (2004a), is discussed in the later section. 
Flexible Deterministic Packet Marking (FDPM) 
Flexible Deterministic Packet Marking utilizes a flexible length mark that consists of hom I () bits to 24 bits 
fields in the IP header. When the packet enters the protected network, it will be marked by the interface 
close to the source of the packet on an edge ingress router. The mark will not be changed when the packet 
traverses the network. The source IP addresses arc stored in the marks. At any point within the network, the 
source IP addresses can be assembled when they arc necessary. Mark-spoofing by the attackers is not 
effective because all the packets will be marked by the very first router the packet passes. So this scheme is 
naturally free of mark-spoofing. The method includes two processes, encoding and reconstruction. The 
ingress IP address is divided into k segments, which means these k parts are stored into the marks to 
reconstruct one source IP address. The segment number keeps the order of the address bits. The address 
digest enables the reconstruction process to recognize the packets being analysed are from a same source. 
The reconstruction includes mark recognition and address recovery. Address recovery will analyse the 
mark and store the mark into a recovery table. The column of the table is k, which means how many 
segments are used to carry one source address in the packets. Each column in the same row stores the bits 
in the same IP address which is carried by different coming packets. The row of the table means the entry; 
usually each digest owns one entry. However, the same digest may have several entries. Different source IP 
addresses may have the same digest because the digest is the compressed inf01111ation of hashed source IP 
address. The digest is shorter than the real IP address. When this collision occurs, more than one entry may 
be created in order to keep as much as possible information. 
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Under the optimal situation, the maximum number of source IP addresses which can be traced in by FDPM 
is 262144. Theoretically, it is 128 times of that of DPM. This figure shows the comparison of maximum 
number of sources can be traced under different situations (the length of mark could be from 16 to 24) by 
FDPM and DPM. 
Ilumber of attackers could be traced 
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In(tl) 8 
6 
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Figure]: Maximum Number of Sources Can Be Traced Under Different Situations 
COMPARISON 
All of these three defence mechanisms offer advantages and disadvantages to defeat the IP spoofing attacks 
as shown in the following table. 
Table ]. Comparison between different counterme(/\'ures 
Countermeasure Main features Advantages Oi sadvantages 
s 
Authentication and Prevent • A void malicious • Lack of 
Enclyption unauthenticated code injection coordination 
users and • Ineffective when is 
eavesdropping passed by attackers 
Filtering Dropping the • Can filter out the II Only effective when 
unwanted packets spoofed IP packets it is deployed 
in routers • Potential to defend globally 
the highly 
distributed attacks 
Traceback Identify the real II Can not only be • Needs a long time 
source of the used in IP spoofing and heavy 
attacking packets problem, but also be computation load to 
used in packet establish the real 
filtering path 
II Can only track IP 
packets in a 
probabilistic 
manner 
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DISCUSSION 
Legislation 
Legislation is needed to control the security problems in the cyber world. Currently laws have been enacted 
to protect privacy, infrastructure, people, and companies. The incident of 9/11 in the US makes people 
aware of the importance of legislation to defeat terrorism, including cyber terrorism. In Australia, many 
laws have been enacted to combat the cyber terrorism, such as the information Privacy Act 2000. Under 
these acts, the government has introduced a number of new sanctions and penalties in response to the new 
threats posed by the cyber terrorists and criminals. They give federal law enforcement agencies the 
authority to investigate and prosecute groups who use the Internet to plan and launch attacks that could 
seriously interfere with the functioning of both government and industry. 
Other countries such as the US also passed many laws to protect the information infrastructure, for 
example, the J 996 National Information InfiYlstructure Protection Act, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
and so on. 
Economic Impact 
Today the IP spoofing attacks result in actual huge financial costs, decreases in revenue, and an incredible 
impact on productivity. Viruses, DDoS and other malicious attacks are growing in number and so are the 
costs incurred by companies, government organizations, and private individuals to get their systems back 
into working order. Some of these incidents pose more significant threats than others. The theft of national 
security information tI'om a government agency or the interruption of electrical power to a major 
metropolitan area would have greater consequences for national security, public safety, and the economy 
than the defacement of a website. But even the less serious categories have real consequences and, 
ultimately, can undennine public confidence in web-based commerce and violate privacy or property 
rights. Large scale failures of the Internet can have a catastrophic impact on the economy which relies 
heavily on electronic transactions. With such huge potential of losses, industries and govemments are 
willing to invest a large amount of resources to combat the threat, so more sophisticated countermeasures 
may result soon. 
CONCLUSION 
IP spoofing is a serious problem in the cyber world. Some security researchers are predicting not only the 
IP spoofing attacks, but also the application-related spoofing in which hackers can exploit a weakness in a 
particular service to send and receive information under false identities will spread in the Internet. This 
paper introduces IP spoofing attacks and current countermeasures, which include authentication and 
encryption, filtering and IP traceback. In particular, an IP traceback mechanism, Flexible Deterministic 
Packet Marking (FDPM) is presented. IP spoofing problem can not be solved only by technology, but it 
also needs social regulation, such as legislation. However, there is still a long way toward realizing the 
secure cyber world paradigm. New challenges are assured as the attackers continue to seek out 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses in our critical information infrastructures. 
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